1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
AD5 Taiwan Hokkien AD5



Therefore, there is a certain social stigma attached to the adopted husband. The villagers often refer to such a husband as a *chui hsu* or a *chao fu*, terms which in themselves may indicate some feeling of derision. While the terms, as compounds, generally mean a son-in-law who lives with his wife's family, taken separately there is a derogatory quality in the individual components of the compounds. For example, *hsu* means son-in-law, but the literal meaning of the other word of the compound, *chui*, is irrelevant, useless, or a parasite. In the second compound, although *fu* has the general meaning of husband or man, *chao* means to beckon, to call, or to give notice.

Although the institution of husband adoption is recognized as a necessity in some cases, most villagers look down on such a husband and, in a sense, consider him an incomplete man. There are jokes made about adopted husbands, sometimes even in their presence, and if a man is henpecked or does chores for his wife which a woman would normally do for herself, the villagers are likely to say he is "being like an adopted husband." The attitudes of the other village men toward the adopted husband vary according to the kind of person he is, but generally such a man finds it difficult to win the respect of his peers. Unless he is an aggressive person, he is unlikely to speak out in a male group, since he knows the other men will pay little attention to him. For this reason, few men or their families will agree to a marriage by adoption unless the family is very poor, has little or no land for the son to inherit, and cannot afford a regular marriage for him. The men in Hsin Hsing village who have become adopted husbands were usually at the average marriageable age for men at the time of adoption; they were not adopted into the girl's family in their youth or at any time before the actual marriage.

The family wishing to adopt a husband for their daughter must offer some firm reward such as land or money. Then, sometimes a poor and perhaps ambitious but "thick-skinned" man will agree to become an adopted husband. The boy may know and like the girl and so be willing to give himself for adoption as a husband.

The family which brings in a husband for their daughter may do so out of a need for the man's labor or from a desire to have descendants. Perhaps the more common situation solved by such an adoption is when a family has a marriageable daughter and a much younger son who, because of his youth, will be unable to work the family land for a number of years. Frequently, there is a written or verbal contract which stipulates the terms of the marriage by adoption. The agreement in a situation like the one just described is usually effected for a specific number of years, or at least until the wife's younger brother is old enough to take over the management of the family's land. The husband agrees to live in his wife's family home, accept the authority

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
AD5 Taiwan Hokkien AD5



of his father-in-law, work for the family as he would for his own, give at least the second-born child the wife's surname, and sometimes even promise that he and any offspring from the marriage will worship the wife's ancestors. In return, the adopted husband's family is spared the usual heavy expenses of marriage, and the man himself gets a wife whom he could not normally afford. He can raise a family, even if it will not be fully under his own authority for a number of years. Most important of all, he is promised either a definite sum of money or rice or a certain amount of land at the expiration of the contract period. 583 675 [591]

At the end of the contract period the adopted husband with his wife and children may remain in the wife's family home if they get along well with them, especially with her younger brother's family. More often, the family will divide into two separate units, although the wife with her adopted husband and children may remain in the same house or village with her family. However, when the two families do not get along well and the husband is too bothered by his inferior status in his wife's village, he may move his wife and children to his own village if there is room in his family's house or village and if he can manage to earn a living there. It seems to be more common for the adopted husband to take his wife and children to another place after fulfilling his contract than to remain with his wife's family. Although an adopted husband who has a forceful personality may assume actual authority over his family, after the separation from the wife's family, it is the wife and not the husband who is officially recognized as the *chia chang* of the family. 583 675 591 594 [558]

Sometimes a husband is adopted into a family which has no sons in order to furnish descendants. The adoption of a husband for this purpose differs in one important way from the adoption of a husband when the wife has a younger brother. The living arrangement of the adopted husband in the girl's family is likely to become permanent. Since there is no younger brother and his family to complicate family relations, the adopted husband and his wife and children may simply continue to live with the wife's family and therefore transmit the names of both families through their children. 583 591

Whether the family of the wife and her adopted husband remains in her family's house or goes to live in his natal village or family home, the general manner of naming children and assigning descent lines is the same. Usually, the first child is given the father's surname, and the second child—whether it is a boy or a girl—receives the mother's family name. All subsequent children bear the father's surname. The one child bearing the surname of the mother's family will inherit property through that family, and is responsible for carrying on the mother's line and the worship of her ancestors. If, however, no child is given the mother's family name, as is sometimes the case if there is no property 583 551 611 428

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
AD5 Taiwan Hokkien AD5



Thus, by reason of their *tsu* or other patrilineal relationships and their physical proximity, such groups within the village tend more easily to become cooperating units in many phases of their daily lives. In addition to the small amount of corporate land which one of the village *tsu* groups owns, some *tsu* (and, more frequently, patrilineal relatives who have recently divided into separate households) may continue to share certain expensive farm implements or may even buy them cooperatively. Such implements will usually be rented out to a nonrelated villager, but they will be lent out without charge to a *tsu* or other patrilineal relative as long as there is no bad feeling between the two related families. Therefore, a member of one of the two Shih families which is not affiliated with the other two Shih *tsu* and which lives in a separate part of the village—but which recognizes a shared mainland ancestor with one of the Shih *tsu*—receives the loan of the latter's threshing machine without charge. Although they do not recognize an actual *tsu* relationship with him, they do feel he is more than simply an ordinary *ch'in t'ang*, and thus they lend him things which others would normally pay to use.

Patrilineally related families are also more frequently willing to lend each other small amounts of money without any interest charge, and it is very common to find such families, again especially those which have recently divided, cooperating in odd chores which demand more labor than any individual economic family may have available. As mentioned in Chapter 3, they frequently exchange labor at harvest-time—possibly without counting a day for a day. In one case, a joint family which had a married son in the army divided itself economically, thus leaving the soldier son's wife and child on their own. This division was initiated by the wife, who did not get along with the family and thought she could manage better alone. After the division, however, she very soon found herself unable to manage, and it was necessary for her husband's father and brothers and *ch'in tsu* in the village to help her. The villagers were critical of her; they felt that before division, as one family, the others had to help her as a matter of course. But once the bond was broken, she had to seek their help and in so doing incurred an obligation to them and lost some face.

Weddings bring forth the most obvious form of cooperation between patrilineal relatives. There are great festivities on such occasions, and the family of the bride or groom entertains many people, especially *ch'in ch'i* and friends from outside the village, at a banquet. At such times the family needs a great deal of extra help in serving the food to the many guests and in acting as hosts. Patrilineal relatives play an important part on these occasions, since they do not need to be formally entertained as do *ch'in ch'i* and friends from outside the village with whom there is a more formal relationship.

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
AD5 Taiwan Hokkien AD5



The situation developed largely when the traditional land tenure system was modified by Taiwan's Land Reform Program between 1949–1953. An important aspect of the reform was the initiation of a rent reduction and limitation law, but even more important was the introduction of an official contract between landlord and tenant which secured the tenant's rights on the land whatever the relationship, good or bad *kan-ch'ing*, he had with the landlord. The contract for the first time made it clear that the relationship between landlord and tenant and their mutual responsibilities were economic. Once their interaction was limited to an economic relationship as circumscribed by an official contract, it was no longer as important whether either party concerned himself with the traditional maintenance of good *kan-ch'ing*.

Thus, in addition to the already discussed decline of some landlords' socioeconomic and even political interests in the village as a result of the land reform, the deterioration in the basis of *kan-ch'ing*, and with it the prestige of many in the landlord class, has frequently meant that unless landlords who remained in the village had other ways of maintaining their high positions in the community, they lost their usefulness as mediators, being no longer capable of exerting influence and leadership in the community.

On the kinship level, the code which regulated relationships between hierarchal unequals has likewise been affected by change, thus worsening the community's ability to resolve local social conflict. This has occurred on the levels of the *tsu* and even, to some degree, the family. In conflict within the *tsu* or village, as well as beyond the village, the *tsu* organizations through their leaders have always played a role in settling all conflict by mediation. While the several Hsin Hsing *tsu* have never been powerful organizations backed by extremely wealthy members and wealth in corporate land usually necessary to give them extensive local sociopolitical influence, *tsu* authority has recently been further weakened, as we have seen above, by the extension of the villagers' socioeconomic interests beyond the home area. As a result, even the *tsu* have apparently lost much of their ability to exert sanctions against their own members or their opponents. Thus, as a result of the weakening of the social hierarchy, there has developed a more general inability to use the former traditional respect for particular leaders of the landlord class or *tsu* as a force with which to settle disagreements.

It is not purely a matter of the weakening of the traditional hierarchical relationships between people, however, which has diminished the respect for traditional mediators. This has been intensified by the tendency toward a growing equalitarianism on both the social and economic levels of life among the villagers. The tendency was born of greater educational opportunities, increased election of officials, land

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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redistribution, and land contracts, all of which have helped to equalize economic means and social relations. While this has not stopped the peasants from recognizing the former landlords' higher status and power, their willingness to accept them as mediators has clearly diminished, as has this formerly powerful group's interests in such community service.

The loss of prestige and authority of the traditional mediators, and thus the decline of success of mediation, has also been accompanied by a questioning of a principle aim of mediation—that the goal of the conflict resolution is to enable the people concerned to continue to live harmoniously together.

Many local villagers are no longer so strongly wedded to the village as a result of their newly developing relations with the greater market economy and the increased economic opportunities for migration to cities. For example, one consequence is that they are no longer concerned with settling disputes with the idea of solely preserving harmonious relations locally. While this is still very important for many people, it is no longer practically universal.

Thus, as a result of the greater society's impingement on village life and, at the same time, the villagers' economic need for involvement beyond the village area, the village and even the kinship groups now have difficulty in maintaining themselves as the villagers' source of solidarity and identification. The villagers' response is actively and consciously to reach out beyond the village and even the *tsu*, not particularly for political power as the gentry always did, but primarily for the socioeconomic reinforcement of their security. As the villager is more and more forced to reach beyond the village, the effect is to further weaken his identification with his village and to a lesser extent with his local kinship group, thus necessitating his even further dependency on and need of the outside.

It appears that such a breakdown of traditional village and kinship relationships has long been going on in much of rural China as a result of some form of urban contacts. Such social change has been accelerated even more markedly in mainland China under the Communists during this last decade and a half. The more extreme breakdown of such traditional village, kinship, and family relationships now apparently taking place on the mainland of China has been attributed to the introduction of communism and its ideological attack on such traditional Chinese concepts as the large family and kinship group. However, taking the situation in Taiwan as an analogy it appears likely that such developments are equally attributable to the urbanization and socioeconomic changes of the twentieth century, speeded up through the methods employed by the Chinese Communists rather

583 his face at stake in these negotiations. On the one hand, he is inter-
584 ested in giving little and receiving much, while, on the other, he is concerned to preserve if not enhance his standing in the eyes of his
583 friends and neighbors. It is a generally accepted principle in these
584 negotiations that your face is at stake when you are "coming" and that
554 my face is at stake when I am "going", which is to say that we can both
558 gain face by giving generously. But, on the other hand, there is a counter principle which says that an inappropriately small gift is an insult, and since the object of any insult loses face, we must both be as concerned about what we receive as about what we give. If I give a bride price which is less than a person of your social standing might expect from a person of my social standing, this is an insult and causes you to lose face; while if you send your daughter with a dowry which is less than I have a right to expect given our relative status, this is an insult to me and may cause me to lose face. The dowry and bride price must therefore be of approximately the same size; the values of the two must be something we can both afford and are both willing to pay; and yet we must both be able to satisfy whatever desire we may have of enhancing our social standing with a display of generosity. Considering that the value of a bride price and dowry are not easily equated, and also that any two families will almost never agree as to the relative importance of prestige and economy, one can easily understand why these negotiations often last for months and try the patience of the most hardened go-between.

offset by gifts received from friends and relatives at the time of the wedding. Depending upon their degree of relationship, relatives usually give between NT$40 and NT$80, except for the groom's mother's brother who must give at least NT$500; and friends and neighbors usually give NT$20 to NT$30, although good friends may give considerably more. But while these gifts are a welcome boon, they do not even meet the cost of the wedding feast which is approximately NT$80 per guest. Given then that the average family's gross income is somewhere between NT$15,000 and NT$20,000 one can understand why it is that many families are reluctant to undertake a preferred marriage for even one son, let alone two or three. The cost of even one such marriage may put a family into debt for years.

There are, of course, various ways in which a family can economize on the preferred form of marriage. They can bargain over the bride price until it is reduced to the bare minimum; they can buy the lightest and least expensive jewelry available; the wedding feasts can be limited to the family's closest relatives; and such common elaborations as a band and taxicabs can be eliminated. The point is that if a family has to economize so drastically it is better for them to adopt a sîm-pûa than to even attempt the preferred marriage. For the same reason that a family can gain face by marrying a son in the preferred way, they can lose face by carrying out such a marriage in a manner that does not satisfy people's expectations. A sîm-pûa marriage does not enhance one's social position, but neither does it involve the risk of losing such prestige as the family may enjoy.

553 554 Moreover, the family which cannot really afford the expense of the preferred marriages takes the risk of not being able to find a daughter-in-law. Knowing that the prospective groom's family cannot afford a generous bride price and an elaborate wedding, many families will be unwilling to give their daughters in marriage. To be allied to such a family would reflect unfavorably upon their own social position. As we have mentioned earlier, a family will occasionally economize by holding the engagement and the wedding on the same day, but such marriages are not easily arranged and are certainly not common. In one instance in which such an arrangement occurred in Hsiachichou the bride was at least six months pregnant, so that her parents obviously had little to say about their choice of in-laws.

The preferred form of marriage is, then, the favored form of marriage. It gives the family who can afford such a marriage the satisfaction of having proceeded in the proper way, and it also has the advantage of enhancing their position in the eyes of the relatives and neighbors. In so far as the form of marriage itself is concerned the sīm-pūa marriage is clearly a second choice, but it does have the [556] compensation of being considerably less expensive. We should therefore expect wealthy families to choose the more prestigious preferred marriage for their sons, while poor families might be expected to choose the less ostentatious but cheaper sīm-pūa form of marriage. Unfortunately, we cannot test this hypothesis in the case of Hsiachichou. [125] We do not have the information to compare families of the pre-1930 period in terms of their relative incomes, and in the post-1930 period

*583 only a very few sīm-pûa adoptions took place. These do all happen to
*584 be among the poorer families of the village, but the numbers are so
559 small that there is no possibility of a reliable test of the relation-
• 558 ship. Until such time as data is collected in other communities which
128 are demonstrably richer or poorer than Hsiachichou forty years ago,
we will have to be content with the villagers own statements that the
relative cost of the two forms of marriage was one of the factors which
they took into account in making their decisions.

*583 One thing, however, is clear. Although it is likely that eco-
*584 nomic considerations played a large role in the choice between the two
556 forms of marriage, these are by no means the only considerations which
entered into the decision. The poor may have chosen the sīm-pûa
marriage more often than the wealthy, but there were nonetheless
many wealthy families which preferred this form of marriage. A family
which was wealthy enough to build the first brick house in Hsiachichou
adopted a sīm-pûa for one of their sons, and the three families with
the largest land holdings in Hsiachichou in the pre-war period adopted
sīm-pûa for three of their six sons. There would seem to be no ques-
tion that these families could have afforded the more prestigious pre-
ferred form of marriage, and yet in some cases all chose the less
prestigious sīm-pûa marriage. We also know of several cases of truly
wealthy families living in the market town who adopted sīm-pûa for one
or more of their sons. One of these families was the largest land-
owner in the area, and was obviously not deterred by the cost of the
preferred form of marriage. Since one would expect the very wealthy to

000 *583 591 family decision. The decisions which concern most families are how their children are to marry, not whether or not they should marry. Decisions about the sim-pua form of marriage must be made early in the family cycle, and so the alternatives at this point are the preferred form of marriage and some form of matrilocal marriage. A daughter may be married out of the family in the preferred way, or she may be used to bring a son-in-law into the family by means of a matrilocal marriage. A son may either be retained as a member of his natal family by means of the preferred marriage, or he may be allowed to marry out of the family to become a member of his wife's household. Since the decisions which many families make about the marriages of their daughters depend in large part upon the availability of men willing to make matrilocal marriages, we will begin our analysis with a discussion of some of the considerations which make men more or less willing to marry into a woman's family.

*583 591 • 558 As is the case in China generally, Hokkien men are usually reluctant to make a matrilocal marriage. According to an informant who had himself married matrilocally, one reason is that "no one ever respects a man who marries into his wife's family." Since a man's primary duty to his parents is to provide them with descendants and to support them in their old age, the man who makes a matrilocal marriage is often accused of being unfilial. Also, there is the widespread assumption that a man who makes such a marriage must be poor. A matrilocal marriage is one way in which a poor man can obtain a wife without paying a bride price, and so it is easily said of any man who makes such a marriage

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that "he couldn't even afford a bride price." Even if a man's parents are dead or living with one of his brothers and he is himself obviously capable of earning a living, he still cannot entirely avoid the onus of having married into his wife's family. It is generally understood that a man loses face by making a matrilocal marriage, and the man who makes such a marriage may therefore always be accused of "not caring about face." As is so often the case with stereotypes, this one is self-perpetuating. The very fact that a man makes a matrilocal marriage is sufficient proof that he is "just the kind of man who would marry into his wife's family."

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Another reason many men give for reluctance to marry matrilocally is the difficult position they would occupy in their wife's family. The man who makes a matrilocal marriage is often treated by his wife's relatives as though his status were closer to that of a child than an adult male. He is expected to defer to them in all matters, and he may be reprimanded and criticized without regard to his status. This was particularly noticeable in the case of a man by the name of Ong Bun-iek who had married into the family of a former prostitute who already had several illegitimate children at the time of their marriage. Living in a large compound in which he was surrounded by his wife's relatives, Ong Bun-iek was forever subjected to overweening authority. One day while we were talking to him one of his wife's children complained that he had given him less rice than he had given to his own children. Ong Bun-iek scolded the child, and when the boy wouldn't stop complaining, hit him. Ong Bun-iek's wife's father's

583 591 606 581 parents. As a consequence, a matrilocal marriage is much less likely to succeed than a patrilocal marriage. We do not know of a single case of a daughter-in-law's deserting her husband's family or a son's failing in his obligations to support his parents in their old age. By comparison, we know of at least 8 cases in which matrilocal marriages failed in their original purpose. Aside from the 2 instances in which the parents drove their son-in-law out of the family, our genealogies include 6 cases in which the son-in-law deserted of his own accord. In 3 of these cases the wife remained with her parents, and in 3 cases the husband persuaded his wife to bring the children and leave with him.

583 591 588 581 We have already seen that it is "only a man who doesn't care about face" who will marry into his wife's family. Although the point is one which is not ordinarily made in discussions of matrilocal marriage in China, the woman's family does not lose face by arranging such a marriage for their daughter. The marriage does not enhace their status as would a preferred marriage, but neither is it something of which they must be ashamed. What concerns a family considering such a marriage is not what other people will say, but rather the question of the risks involved in such an arrangement. A family is always concerned that their son-in-law will not be a man of good character, for they too assume that no good man is ever willing to make such a marriage. More importantly, they are aware of the fact that such marriages are much less stable than patrilocal marriages. The man who is willing to marry into their family may desert them in their old age, and may even manage to "steal" their daughter and their grandchildren. In discussing the rela-

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593 Another argument on the same subject a few days later ended with Lin
578 Li-kui threatening her daughter with a cleaver. Lin A-sui simply
578 stood her ground and encouraged her mother, "Kill me! I don't care!
Kill me!"

593 In most cases in which a daughter dares to quarrel openly with one
548 of her parents, public opinion will be quick to condemn her, but if the
208 girl is a prostitute the tendency is to side with the daughter against
her parents. Most village gossips discussing current quarrels between prostitutes and their parents label the parents "selfish" and deserving of whatever ill fortune their fate might bring them. The attitude of the villagers seems to be that while a parent has the right to command a daughter to work as a prostitute they cannot expect the daughter to pay them the respect ordinarily due a parent. It is as though the debt a child owes to her parents is entirely repaid when she submits to such a demand.

593 Prostitution is one way in which a family can use their daughters
562 to obtain heirs and support for their old age, and it is the only way
548 in which a woman who does not marry can provide for herself and her future. Prostitution might therefore be characterized as an alternative to marriage, but it is always an undesirable alternative. For [558] the prostitute it means anything but a normal life, and for her family there is always some loss of face. Worse yet, for the parents there is always the danger that they are sacrificing as much as they are gaining. In sending a daughter to work they may be able to manage without a marriage in the next generation, but this is accomplished only

735 These practices are not obvious to the casual ob-
• 558 server for much is done to preserve "face." Since anyone who begged would necessarily lose face, there must be an avoidance of either asking for items or of offering items in a manner which suggest the receiver has need of them. Clothes are given to someone for example, because they no longer fit. Someone announces in a group that some of his vegetables are going rotten in the field because there is no one available to pick them. However, careful watch is kept on those who help themselves and since everyone's financial condition is well known, few people other than the poor are permitted to take advantage of the situation. Those who benefit most from these customs are usually widows or old men who have never married.

511 In summary, there does not appear to be anyone in
621 an extremely poor position economically in Sanlei village. Although some people are much better off than others, the differences in clothing, daily diet, and style of life are
[648] not great and no one ever appears to go hungry. There is
[829] some nostalgia for the period of the Japanese occupation when prices were said to be much lower but in fact, it appears that everyone is eating better and richer foods than ever before in history for although prices are high-
735 er, so is income. The system of pai pai with many invited
504 guests helps the poor to share the prosperity as does the reduction in the cost of goods and services, all leveling

666 632 The use of the term election in this account carries implications which are misleading for in Talei, elections themselves are rarely contests, and only serve, for the most part, to formally confirm a decision reached by consensus.

666 558 632 There is a long history in China of local control and local decision-making processes, usually based on finding a reasonable consensus as described above. There was also an underlying assumption that since the winner in a contest and the loser together with their respective descendants would continue to live in the same community for a long time, it was permitted to beat an opponent but not to destroy him. If no one loses too much face, it is possible to continue life together without great disharmony. The loser should be given status to recompense his loss and the majority should consider the desires of the minority by finding solutions nearly everyone can accept. Within the li, although not at higher administrative levels, there is a practice of having the runner-up elected to a secondary position.

The sentiment is also expressed in other ways, i.e., entertainment shows hired by the entire li alternate regularly in location from Erhlei to Sanlei in spite of the number of votes or amount of money contributed by either for both regions are expected to share prestige.

474 claim that every conflict should be resolved and almost
666 everyone agrees that since there are two factions, each should be represented even if one does not have sufficient votes to insure election. This may be partially related to the old belief in consensus rather than majority rule.
• 558 Additionally, no one should lose "face," i.e., be too
621 embarrassed. The badly defeated man had lost face but
476 gained much of it back by being elected a representative.

Since the above value is important, let me illustrate it in another context. When money is collected for civic improvements or social affairs, some poor people pay nothing and some rich people pay more than their assessment. When names and contributions are posted on the temple, incorrect figures are listed so that everyone is indicated as donating something. Only the committee chairman or the li chang would know the truth about the whole community and the various lin chang or assistant committee chairmen would know the truth about their own neighborhoods. Thus, face can be saved by the poor although richer villagers are not earning deserved levels of prestige which are related to the size of the donation. Someone who did not pay an amount commensurate with the committee opinion would be so posted and thereby, lose face. The threat is so great that it has happened only once in Sanlei in the past twenty years.

427 is not married and still earns a good income in his trade
686 and the tenant is still poor with small children, the
692 same outcome of another extension is expected. But since the owner is seeking a wife, he plans to argue that he too will soon have small children to support. He does not expect to regain possession of the land but rather, to minimize the term of the extension and set the stage for eventual control of the land after the next lease termination. The owner is annoyed but does not feel the decision was unreasonable. Other villagers agree the owner had the law on his side and a legal claim to the land. Nevertheless, they too agree the decision was the only "fair" solution. The owner and tenant are neighbors and although there are some hard feelings, overt expression of them was not observed.

674 There have been few formal arrests of villagers and few occasions in which villagers have appeared before a criminal court. The son of a villager with a repair shop in town is serving a six-month sentence on a bad check charge which he claims was caused by someone who stole his
689 "chop." Another villager was arrested twice for being drunk and disorderly in Hsin Tien and each time, spent the night in jail. In addition to a small fine, he was forced to listen to a stern lecture which caused him a great loss of face.

Interpersonal Relations and "Face"

626 571 558 [262] There is seldom a "face to face" confrontation where someone directly informs another he has done wrong or is a bad man. Instead, there is considerable gossip so that a criticism soon trickles back to the accused. A villager took a turtle-dough cake home from a religious festival and incurred an obligation to return a larger cake the next year which he failed to accomplish. The temple committee members told many people about the failure but would not confront the transgressor in person. The committee posted two lists on the temple bulletin board, one specifying those who had taken home turtle-dough cakes and the other, those who had returned cakes the next year. Although a cursory comparison of the two lists would quickly reveal any violators, the committee claimed they just could not post a list which separately listed those who had refused to return turtle-dough cakes. This concept of "face" with a requirement for both avoiding giving offense and helping others to avoid giving offense does minimize the occurrence of conflict by discouraging the open expression of differences or criticisms.

558 571 576 "Face" does seriously hamper interpersonal relations on another level in spite of its employment in promoting harmony. It is necessary that one does not give offense and it is equally necessary that one helps

558 to prevent another from giving offense. Because a flat
576 no to someone by definition necessarily gives offense,
571 there are special problems in asking for a job, hiring a laborer, or extending a dinner invitation for it is necessary to do considerable hinting before a direct question is asked. When an invitation to dinner is extended formally, both parties are clearly aware that the invitation is coming and the answer will be yes. If the clues were misinterpreted, one accepts the invitation and then just does not show up. Not to show up after accepting is an insult but is not on a face-to-face basis and therefore, is not as serious. No excuse will be given later and the host will never mention it. Many dinner invitations are not extended until a few minutes before dinner. According to Chen Shao-hsing, the Chinese "yes" often has two meanings, one an affirmation, the other a polite refusal (1963:58). The closest analogy in American culture is the hiring process described by Caplow and McGee (1962) for some university positions, particularly those of higher ranks. The professor indicates he may be available while the university indicates it may have an opening. After considerable discussion, an offer may be made. However, a firm clear offer is rarely tendered without an understanding it will be accepted.

12. In Riesman's terms (1950), the "tradition directed"
558 social character is predominant for Sanlei with the
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121 community as the main agency of socialization and shame,
558 the psychological mechanism promoting conformity. This
571 is explored more fully in the chapter on the life cycle,
576 but elements are important for this discussion. Tradition
626 is important. Some people, particularly older ones, are considered to have such expertise with regard to cultural norms that acceptance of their authoritative interpretation of norms is frequent and natural. For example, a recently married woman wanted to go see her sister's new baby but knew there was some avoidance rule involving brides and babies. After learning from an older woman that a bride brought misfortune to a baby less than 30 days old, she willingly accepted the ruling and did not even seem disappointed. In many cases, there is this quite willing acceptance of custom for its own sake.

[562] In summary, it appears that women are not significant on an overt level for social control in the contexts discussed in this chapter. They do not really participate in formal rule, politics, or most political units. Their effects are more covert. They influence men and are extremely significant in the socialization process which builds into individuals the internal mechanisms of social control.

178 1943. The decline appears to continue for the P. K. C.
583 Liu study in 1967 for Shihlin indicates less than 5% of the
591 households were matrilocal (1967:34). No matter what year is selected from the above as a standard, Sanlei is deviant. Of the 94 marriages previously listed, nineteen were regular matrilocal with an adopted-in husband and six more are also classified as matrilocal, an adopted-in husband for a daughter who had been previously adopted-in as a child. Twenty-five such marriages constitute 26.6% of the total studied, a percentage higher than Barclay lists above for any year in Taiwan, even 1906. Only Wolf furnishes exact figures based on full data acquired ethnographically for a village also located in the Taipei region. Among 119 married men, 26 were chao fu (1966:889) resulting in a percentage of 21.8% which is not unlike Sanlei's 26.6%.

114 Barclay's figures regarding this form of marriage
583 are questionable. He reports that there were significant
591 problems in translation for "the terms are Japanese and the facts Chinese" (1954:228). Furthermore, he points out that other compromises may be made, the marrying male may assume the wife's surname (1954:228) and this could make errors in
[559] records. As discussed by Gallin (1966:156-8) and Barclay (1954:229), because the adopted-in husband loses his dignity and authority and is often insulted, there would be strong reasons favoring an attempt to conceal the true incidence.

583 prospects to become an adopted-in husband for he does gain
556 a wife, usually without cost, and also gains a home and an
581 economic stake in his wife's property, the extent determined by negotiation.

583 At marriage, adopted-in husbands are older than
582 regular husbands, 27.1 versus 25.8, but their brides are younger, 19.8 versus 21.2. Although I was not able to establish the explanation with certainty, it does appear that the older age for men is related to their inferior prospects as grooms. The younger age for women seems due to two facts. For one, they are probably acceding to parental wishes for fear of the lack of descendants; for the other, there is the absence of any pressure to delay marriage because of the girl's economic or labor contributions since she will not be leaving the household.

573 Most men state they would not like to be an adopted-
559 in husband, a chao fu. However, the status of an adopted-in husband does not appear to be as low in Sanlei as has been described in some other communities (Gallin, 1966: 136; Barclay, 1954:229). For example, one adopted-in husband is the elected representative to the farmers' association, another is the chairman of the mediation team for a nearby coal mine, and yet another was the pot master for the last Matsu festival. Perhaps the differences in status are related to the frequency of matrilocal marriages in various communities. Only West Town among the Chinese

583 ethnographies has a higher percentage of adopted-in husbands than Sanlei and Hsu states that such a husband does not have low status (1967:98). Sanlei villagers indicate it is a natural process to adopt husbands, what else can a family without a son do?

583 183 123 The frequency of this form of marriage has important implications for the role of women. There are probably regional variations across China with respect to rates but, as stated, rarely are competent data provided in ethnographic studies to support the summaries and abstractions. Because of the low status usually claimed for chao fu marriage, it is likely the estimates by villagers on which the summary may be based would be low. Among 15 Sanlei men, the average guess at the incidence of chao fu marriage was 1 in 10 with a single high guess of 1 in 7 by an old man. Since the actual incidence was higher than 1 in 4, this inaccuracy is significant. If this dissertation was based on interviews and the impressions of informants rather than on actual counting, a quite different picture would likely have emerged.

593 583 Many, if not all accounts of the Chinese family discuss the great period of stress for the new bride when she enters her husband's home as a virtual stranger as one important factor contributing to her lowly condition. Conversely, few reports discuss the role of men in the case of the chao fu marriage who enter the bride's home as a